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Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program or Traditional Government Payment 
Programs: What Factors Matter?  
Yunguang Chen, H. Holly Wang, George F. Patrick 
Abstract 
Rankings of different risk management portfolios including Average Crop Revenue Election 
(ACRE), traditional government payment programs, crop insurance and hedging in futures; and 
optimal choices of insurance coverage levels and hedge ratios are evaluated for a representative 
central Indiana corn farm, using Monte Carlo simulation and optimization of expected utilities. 
The changes of preference between ACRE and traditional government programs under 
comprehensive scenarios of price and yield risks are studied. Also, interactions between ACRE 
and other risk management instruments are examined, and government costs and risk 
management efficiencies between ACRE and traditional government programs are compared. 
The results show a strong preference of ACRE for the representative central Indiana corn farm in 
2009, due to high ACRE guarantee price and expected drop in corn price from 2008 level. Even 
if the farm faces weak dependence between farm and aggregate yield, the risk could not offset 
the additional value ACRE could provide for this year. Also, it is found that there are synergistic 
effects between ACRE and two individual crop insurance plans but antagonistic effects between 
ACRE and group insurance plans. ACRE is more efficient than traditional government programs 
in terms of expected program costs. 
Keywords: ACRE, Farm Bill, crop insurance, willingness to pay, government expenditure, 
government programs 
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Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program or Traditional Government Payment 
Programs: What Factors Matter?  
Introduction 
The 2008 Farm Bill introduced Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE), which is the first 
revenue based commodity program. Although ACRE’s market-driven revenue protection gives 
farmers a better shield against financial stress when both crop price and production costs are high 
(Zulauf et al. 2008), individual farmers will still face a difficult decision between ACRE and 
traditional government programs. One of the reasons is that ACRE’s double payment triggers 
and moving revenue benchmarks require farmers to consider both price and yield risks, including 
mutual dependence between individual and aggregate yields and between yields and prices.   
Several studies have identified that the relative payments from the two programs depend on 
the relative levels of guaranteed price parameters in the policies. Cooper (2009) compared 
payments to corn producers from a stylized version of ACRE program and payments from 
traditional government payment programs. Olson and DalSanto (2008) compared expected 
government payments between ACRE and traditional government programs under scenarios of 
different expected price and ACRE guaranteed price. They concluded that traditional programs 
are favored when expected price stay at or above ACRE guaranteed price level.  However, their 
comparison is based on expected payments without considering risk management values.  Power 
et al. (2009) found that traditional government programs are valued higher than ACRE by both 
Texas cotton and Illinois corn farmers. No comprehensive studies are found to investigate the 
relative values of ACRE and traditional government programs being influenced by the joint 
yield-price risks.  4 
 
Another issue under debate is the interaction of ACRE with existing crop insurance 
programs. Zulauf et al. (2008) concluded that although ACRE looks like a revenue insurance 
program, based on historical data and ACRE’s design of double trigger and 25% revenue 
guarantee ceiling, ACRE cannot substitute crop insurance and there are no serious double 
payment problems.  Power et al. (2009) argue that Actual Production History (APH) and Crop 
Revenue Coverage (CRC) insurance instruments work more effectively in combination with 
traditional government programs than with ACRE. In addition, interactions between ACRE and 
group based insurance programs are not investigated.   
From the government point of view, both programs are fully financed by the federal 
government.  It is thus interesting to compare government’s costs in supporting farmers to 
mitigate natural and market risks. 
Our study will fill the gaps in the literature by providing a comprehensive scenario analysis 
on factors affecting farmers’ choices between ACRE and the traditional government programs. 
We will also examine impacts of ACRE on existing crop insurance programs including APH, 
CRC, Group Risk Plan (GRP), and Group Income Protection Plan (GRIP) in the presence of 
hedging in futures market.  Government costs of alternative programs are compared in scenarios 
in which programs provide equivalent levels of support to farmers.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section describes models of different risk 
management instruments used in the portfolio analyses, expected utility model used to derive 
optimal decisions and portfolio rankings, and the structure to calculate farmers’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) as a welfare measure to rank each portfolio. Then, the data and methods of modeling 
stochastic joint yield and price distributions are discussed. The next section presents results from 
the base scenario and then analyzes factors affecting the relative values of ACRE and traditional 5 
 
government programs. The results section concludes with a discussion of the government costs. 
Conclusions and implications are drawn in the last section of the paper.  
Decision Model 
The analysis is based on simulated data for a representative corn farm in Clinton County, 
Indiana. We assume at pre-planting time, the farmer makes a choice between ACRE and 
traditional government programs, one crop insurance program among APH, CRC, GRP, and 
GRIP, and the hedging ratio in futures market. His/her wealth at the harvest time, based on the 
chosen risk management portfolio, is stochastic and can be denoted by (1) on per acre basis: 
                                                             (1) 
where w is total stochastic wealth;  0 w  stands for initial wealth estimated as per acre equity of 
$2,039 from the financial characters of 2009 grain farms in Indiana (Richardson et al. 2010). π is 
the total harvest time profit per acre, including net profit from cash sales, revenue from 
government programs, crop insurance payments, and hedging profits:  
. ) ( ) ( FI GRIP or GRP or CRC or APH CDL or ACRE NP + + + = π                                  (2) 
Definitions of the terms in equation (2) are below: 
P F L C Y P NP − = is net profit from net sales, where  L P is stochastic local corn cash price at 
harvest time,  F Y is stochastic farm yield, and  P C is average production costs per acre which is 
$505 (Miller et al. 2009).  
DP Y Y R T T R R T T ACRE BS BF G F S S G F S * 8 . 0 ) ( * ]} * 25 . 0 * * [ )], ( * * min{[ * 833 . 0 + − =  
LDP * 7 . 0 + , is per acre payment the farmer receives from ACRE program, where  S T and  F T are 
state and farm triggers respectively.  ) /( ) 0 , max( S G S G R R R R Ts − − = and 
) /( ) 0 , max( F BF F BF F R R R R T − − = so that the two triggers could be only one or zero.  G R is 
, 0 π + = w w6 
 
ACRE guaranteed state revenue,  S R is actual state revenue,  BF R  is benchmark farm revenue, and 
F R  is actual farm revenue.  BF Y is benchmark farm yield,  BS Y is benchmark state yield, DP is 
Direct Payment and LDP is Loan Deficiency Payment.  
Terms in the ACRE payment include,  G BS G P Y R * * 9 . 0 = , where  BS Y is five-year Olympic 
moving average state yield;  G P , the ACRE guaranteed price, which is the larger of the average of 
previous two years’ Market Year Average (MYA) price and 70% Loan Rate. One provision of 
G R  when calculating multiple year ACRE payments is that  G R could not increase or decrease 
more than 10% of previous value;  MYA S S P Y R * = , where  S Y  is stochastic state yield and  MYA P  is 
stochastic Market Year Average (MYA) price in 2009;  PREi P Y R G BF BF + = * , where  BF Y  is 
five-year Olympic moving average farm yield, which equals to five-year Olympic moving 
average county yield as we assume the representative farm’s yield equals to county yield; PREi 
is pre acre crop insurance premium paid by the farmer and i stands for a particular crop insurance 
program;  MYA F F P Y R * = , where  F Y is stochastic farm yield; DP DP Y R DP * * 833 . 0 = , where DP 
covers 83.3% of acreage; RDP is DP payment rate, $0.28/bu in 2009 (USDA, ERS, 2009a); YDP is 
DP payment yield, 115bu/acre for Clinton County (USDA, ERS, 2009b); and 
) , 0 max( * L F P LR Y LDP − = , where LR is Loan Rate, which is $1.95/bu in 2009 (USDA, ERS, 
2009c).  
LDP DP CCP CDL + + =  are traditional government program payments including Counter-
cyclical Payment (CCP), DP and LDP.   ] 0 ), , max( max[ * * 85 . 0 LR P R P Y CCP MYA DP CCP CCP − − = , 
where YCCP is CCP payment yield, which equals to 131 bu/acre for Clinton County (USDA, 
ERS, 2009b), and PCCP is CCP target price, which is $2.63/bu (USDA, ERS, 2009c).  7 
 
APH F APH APH APH PRE Y Y C P APH − − = ) 0 , * max( *  is per acre net payment the farmer 
received from individual yield insurance program, where PAPH is Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) defined APH price, which is $4.00/bu (William, 2009). CAPH is an individual crop 
insurance coverage level chosen by the farmer. YAPH is historical average yield for the farm and 
in the simulation it is defined as the average of stochastic farm yield in 2009. PREAPH is premium 
paid by the representative farmer. Assuming the crop insurance is actuarially fair, PREAPH equals 
to the expected payments of APH times a subsidy level corresponding to the chosen coverage 
level.   
CRC F L FU FU APH CRC PRE Y P P P Y C CRC − − = ] 0 , * ) , max( * * max[ 0  is per acre net payment the 
farmer received from individual revenue insurance program, where CCRC is an individual crop 
insurance coverage level chosen by the farmer.  0 FU P  is average price of harvest-time futures 
contract in the pre-planting month and PFU  is stochastic harvest-time futures price. PRECRC is 
premium paid by the representative farmer. Assuming the crop insurance is actuarially fair, 
PRECRC equals to the expected payments of CRC times a subsidy level corresponding to the 
chosen coverage level.   
GRP GRP GRP C GRP GRP GRP PRE Y C Y Y C R GRP − − = ) 0 ), * /( ) * ( * max(  is per acre net payment the 
farmer received from Group Risk Plan (GRP), where RGRP is GRP protection rate, which is 
$480/acre (USDA, RMA, 2009), and CGRP is a group crop insurance coverage level chosen by 
the farmer. YGRP is GRP payment yield, which is defined as the average of stochastic county 
yield Yc, in 2009. PREGRP is premium paid by the representative farmer. Assuming the crop 
insurance is actuarially fair, PREGRP equals to the expected payments of GRP times a subsidy 
level corresponding to the chosen coverage level.   8 
 
GRIP FU C GRIP FU GRIP PRE P Y Y P C GRIP − − = ) 0 , * * * max( 0  is per acre net payment the farmer 
received from Group Income Risk Protection (GRIP), where CGRIP is a group crop insurance 
coverage level chosen by the farmer, and YGRIP is GRIP payment yield, which is defined as the 
average of stochastic county yield Yc, in 2009. PREGRIP is premium paid by the representative 
farmer. Assuming the crop insurance is actuarially fair, PREGRIP equals to the expected payments 
of GRIP times a subsidy level corresponding to the chosen coverage level.   
) ( * * ) ( * ) ( * 0 F FU F FU FU F FU Y mean x C P P Y mean x FI − − =  is the farmer’s net gain from 
futures contract, where xFU  is hedging ratios chosen at pre-planting time, and  F C  is hedging 
transaction cost, which is set at $0.017/bu (Makus, et al, 2007). The simulated futures price is 
adjusted as  0 ) ( FU FU P P E =  to avoid speculating effects (Makus et al, 2007).  
Table 1 shows the summary of defined parameters of government programs and crop 
insurance contracts for Indiana corn farm in 2009.  
The farmer is assumed to choose crop insurance coverage level, hedging ratio, and whether 
ACRE or traditional program to maximize his/her expected utility, and the utility function 
describing the farmer’s attitude towards risk is defined as:  
 
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) (
θ θ
− − − = w w U ,  
where w is stochastic wealth and θ  is relative risk aversion coefficient. This utility function 
shows Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). This CRRA function is also widely used by 
previous research in applied risk management and our study will follow their estimations to set 
the value of θ  at 2 (Makus et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2003; Coble et al. 2000).  
To measure and compare risk management values of different portfolios, Willingness to Pay 
(WTP) is calculated. It is the amount of sure income the representative farm is willing to receive 9 
 
in exchange for the benefit from a particular portfolio. WTP for each risk management portfolio 
is calculated by solving WTP in the equation below:  
)] ( [ )] ) ( ) ( ( [ max 0 0 WTP NP w U E FI GRIP or GRP or CRC or APH CDL or ACRE NP w U E + + = + + + +
                                  
Data and Simulation 
We use Monte Carlo Method to simulate the joint distribution of historical farm, county and 
state level yields combining with futures price, local cash price, and Market Year Average 
(MYA) price. To achieve this goal, marginal distributions of each variable are first estimated and 
then the copula method is used to create and simulate joint distribution based on marginal 
distribution parameters of those variables.  
Data 
Yield data from Clinton County, Indiana, are obtained from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS). Actual farm yield data in Clinton County is collected from Actual 
Production History (APH) record.  516 farms with more than 8 years of actual yield records 
between 1985 and 2006 are used.   
Daily futures prices of November corn futures contract in February (pre-planting) and 
October (harvest) from 1987 to 2008 were collected from Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and 
average prices in those two months were calculated for each year. Weekly local cash price in 
October were collected from central Indiana grain elevators, starting from year 1986, by 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University. Annual cash prices in October were 
then calculated by averaging weekly prices by year.  National average market price from 1987 to 
2008 was collected from NASS. 
Yield Trend 10 
 
To model yield risk, trends need to be estimated to accurately distinguish deterministic and 
stochastic components of yield, as Just and Weninger (1999) point out that misspecification of 
deterministic measurement will invalidate moment assessment of stochastic components. To 
achieve this goal, appropriate yield data range must be first chosen. Longer time range was 
preferred for a more powerful estimation of stochastic yield, as long as a deterministic yield 
trend could be well justified. In this paper, county and state yields from 1930 to 2008 are used 
(Figure 1), because 1930 is the era for Indiana’s agriculture to change from low-input to high-
input system (Egli 2008).   
Suggested by heteroskedasticity test, Box-Cox Transformation Tests, and literature (Power et 
al. 2009; Wang et al. 1998; Deng et al. 2007), state and county yield are modeled using log-
quadratic trend. Due to limited data for individual farm yield, we assumed that sample farms’ 
yield in the same county would follow the same trend as the county yield. The details of 
estimation are in Appendix. 
Detrended Yield Distribution 
Parametric distributions are used to model aggregate yield residuals. First, Shapiro-Wilk 
Tests reject the null hypothesis of normality for both state and county residuals. Second, 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is used to fit residuals to several parametric 
distributions which are often used stochastic yield modeling. Then, p-values from Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) Tests are used to rank fitted continuous distributions (Ricci 2005). The results of 
MLE and rankings of distributions are shown in Appendix.  
According to the p-values of KS Tests, beta distributions are the best one to model state and 
county residuals among the candidate parametric distributions. This is in accordance with the 
current view that stochastic yields are skewed and some previous literatures use beta 11 
 
distributions to model yield risks (Babcock and Hennessy 1996; Nelson and Preckel 1989). Also, 
intuitively the beta distribution’s upper-lower bound and left-skewness are considered a good fit 
to describe weather related non-systematic yield risks and natural limits of crop production (Just 
and Weninger 1999).  
Sample farms are detrended using county trend and their residuals are assumed to follow the 
same distribution as county residual, with a Mean Preserving Spread (MPS) transformation. We 
assume the representative farm will have a county average yield but a different standard 
deviation (SD). To find a SD value which represents average farms in Clinton County, we first 
calculate SD of detrended yield residuals for each sample farm. Then, for each farm sample, we 
calculate its corresponding detrended county residual SD using only the years the sample farm 
report it actual yield. Last, farm to country standard deviation ratios (SD Ratio) for each sample 
farm is calculated. Last, average value of SD Ratio (1.66) is used in MPS transformation to 
simulate stochastic yield distribution for the representative farm.   
Modeling price risks 
Log-normal distribution is commonly used to model the risks for the same futures contract 
passing from known pre-plant futures price to unknown harvest-time futures price (Coble et al. 
2000):  
) , ( ~ ln ; ln ln ln
2
0 FU FU FU FU FU FU N P d P P P d σ µ − = . 
Shapiro-Wilk test of  FU P d ln could not reject the hypothesis that it is normally distributed. In 
order to avoid speculating effects, futures price is assumed unbiased by adjusting  FU µ equals to 
zero, indicating expected harvest-time futures price equals to pre-planting futures price (Wang et 
al., 1998).  12 
 
Price difference model suggested by Witt et al. (1987) is used to model both linear 
relationships between local cash price and harvest-time futures price, and between MYA price 
and harvest-time futures price. Normality tests suggest residuals from both models are normally 
distributed. The details of model description and estimation are in Appendix.  
Correlation Estimation and Joint Distribution  
Since PL and PMYA are modeled as linear relationship with PFU, pairwise correlations among 
PFU, YS, YC, and YF are estimated and then copula method is used to create joint distribution of 
the four variables with desired marginal distributions and correlations matrix (Nelsen, 2006). To 
estimated pairwise correlation between the representative farm yield and PFU, YS, or YC, 516 
sample farm’s pairwise yield correlations with the other three variables are first calculated. Then, 
an average value of each sample pariwise correlation is used to estimate correlations between the 
representative farm and PFU, YS, or YC.  
After estimating pairwise correlations among PFU, YS, YC, and YF, Normal Copula function is 
chosen to create joint distributions with desired marginal distributions and correlations matrix. 
Normal Copula has been used in previous research creating joint distributions among prices and 
yields (Zhu et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2009). It is flexible and allows for balanced positive and 
negative dependence (Trivedi and Zimmer; 2007),  which is suitable for purpose of creating joint 
prices-yields distribution containing both positive and negative correlations. Also, comparing to 
Frank Copula used in study by Power et al. (2009), Normal Copula has stronger tail dependence 
(Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007). This feature gives Normal Copula an advantage to describe the 
situation happening at lower tail, when big disaster usually causes wide region of yield drop 
(higher dependence between farm and aggregate yield), and this big yield drop will also cause 
significant price increase (higher dependence between price and yield). Table 2 shows 13 
 
correlation matrix of simulated stochastic price and yield variables and descriptive statistics of 
those variables.  
Results and Implications 
In this section, the representative farmer’s rank of WTP for each risk management portfolio 
will be discussed first. Then, studies of the farmer’s decisions between ACRE and traditional 
government programs under different scenarios of price and yield risks are carried out. The 
scenarios include changes of expected Market Year Average (MYA) price, change of ACRE 
guarantee price, changes of CCP target price, changes of price-yield correlations, and changes of 
correlations between individual and aggregate yields. In addition to providing the representative 
farmer’s optimal decisions for each risk management portfolio and his/her rankings of different 
portfolios, we also address interactions between ACRE and other risk management instruments. 
Last, expected government cost of ACRE program under base scenario is estimated, and risk 
management efficiencies between ACRE and traditional government programs are compared 
when they share the same WTP values.  
Base Scenario Results 
 The representative farmer’s rankings of different portfolios and his/her optimal choices of 
insurance coverage level and hedge ratio for each risk management portfolio under base scenario 
are presented in Table 3. Portfolios containing ACRE always are ranked higher than 
corresponding ones containing traditional government program, irrespective of the crop 
insurance type.  Similarly, CRC has the highest value followed by APH, GRIP and GRP, with 
either ACRE or traditional programs. Highest coverage levels are always the optimal choice for 
any insurance programs, and the portfolio of ACRE+CRC+Futures has the highest WTP. 14 
 
Interactions between ACRE and crop insurance programs could not be observed, as the optimal 
coverage levels of crop insurance programs do not change when ACRE is included in portfolios.  
 Hedging in futures is a complement to yield insurance, shown by the 29% optimal hedging 
ratio which is highest among the scenarios when it goes with APH only. Although it only 
contributes a small value to portfolios, we still observe the substitutive effect of ACRE on 
futures. The optimal hedge ratios for portfolios containing ACRE decrease significantly, when 
they are compared with the corresponding ones containing traditional or no government 
programs.   
These results differ from the recent study by Power et al. (2009) in two ways. First, in their 
paper, both representative cotton farmer in Texas and corn farmer in Illinois prefer the traditional 
program over ACRE. We find that one of important reasons lies in their assumption that market 
year average prices are higher than ACRE guarantee prices. In the analysis of alternative  
scenarios, we observe the value of ACRE program drops when expected MYA price is higher 
than ACRE guaranteed price. Second, they concluded that APH and CRC are more effective 
under traditional government programs while our following study shows synergy between ACRE 
and the two insurance plans.   
Scenario Analysis 
Several scenarios are analyzed when some policy or market parameters are evaluated at 
different levels ceteris paribus (Table 4). In the first scenario, we examine the effect of increase 
in the expected futures price. MYA and cash price will also increase as they are linearly related 
to futures price. As MYA price increases, WTP of ACRE decreases quickly because of lower 
possibility to trigger payments, and vice versa. WTP of traditional government program also 
decreases when expected futures price increase because of decrease in CCP payment. However, 15 
 
the decrease is trivial as the value of CCP is already very low in base scenario. As a result, the 
difference between ACRE and traditional government programs becomes smaller as the expected 
futures price increases. The second column in Table 4 shows when the increase in expected 
futures price reaches $0.66/bu, the farmer’s WTPs of ACRE and traditional government 
programs are equal. At this indifference point between ACRE and traditional programs, 
interactions between ACRE and crop insurance programs could be observed: when APH and 
CRC are combined with the two programs at their indifference point, portfolios containing 
ACRE become more valuable than the corresponding ones containing traditional government 
program; however, combining with GRP and GRIP creates the opposite effects which causes 
WTPs of portfolios containing ACRE to be lower than those of traditional government program. 
The observations indicate synergistic (complement) effects between ACRE and two individual 
crop insurance plans (APH and CRC) and antagonistic (substitutive) effects between ACRE and 
group insurance plans (GRIP and GRP), comparing to traditional government program. The 
results are reasonable considering ACRE is a group based revenue protection program. 
In the second scenario, we consider the change in ACRE guarantee price. When a change in 
2008 MYA price is assumed, it will cause the same directions of changes in ACRE guaranteed 
price, which is the larger of the average of previous two years’ Market Year Average (MYA) 
price and 70% Loan Rate. Increasing 2008 MYA price will raise the WTP of ACRE as the 
higher ACRE guarantee price makes the program’s payments easier to be triggered, and vice 
versa.  The WTP of traditional government program does not change under this scenario, so the 
changes of ACRE’s values indicate the changes of WTP gap between the two programs. As the 
third column in Table 4 shows, $1.24/bu decrease of 2008 MYA price makes WTP of ACRE and 
traditional government programs equal each other.  16 
 
Changes in CCP target price are analyzed in the third scenario. When CCP target price starts 
to increase, WTP of traditional government program begins to increase, while WTP of ACRE 
stays the same. Thus, WTP difference between ACRE and traditional government program 
deceases. The fourth column in Table 4 shows a $1.24/bu increase of CCP target price makes 
WTPs of ACRE and traditional government programs very similar. We also consider a scenario 
when the price-yield correlations change.  When the negative farm yield-futures price, county 
yield-futures price, and state yield-futures price correlations increase in magnitude, the WTP of 
ACRE decreases, and vice versa. The WTP of traditional government program is not affected. 
Because ACRE is revenue targeted program, its risk management value will decrease when 
revenue risk is reduced by higher price-yield dependency. However, as the fifth column in Table 
4 shows, since current ACRE guarantee price is much higher than CCP target price, ACRE could 
not be reduced to the same value as traditional government program even price-yield correlations 
are increased to the maximum feasible levels (65% increase of correlations between futures price 
and yields).  
The last scenario is for the effect of the farm-aggregate yield correlation change. The WTP of 
ACRE decreases as farm-aggregate yield correlations decrease, and vice versa, while WTP of 
traditional government program stays at the same level. This is because the ACRE’s double 
trigger will favor those farms having higher yield correlations with state level yield. Again, as 
the last column in Table 4 shows, since current ACRE guarantee price is much higher than CCP 
target price, ACRE could not be reduced to be indifferent to traditional government program 
even farm-aggregate correlations are decreased to the minimum (the correlations between farm 
yield and state/county yield is decreased to almost zero). 
Expected Government Cost 17 
 
Expected government cost of current ACRE is $49.0/acre and $27.0/acre for traditional 
government program, indicating ACRE is way more expensive to the federal government. 
However, ACRE provides way higher benefit to farmers. To compare risk management 
efficiency between ACRE and traditional government program, their expected costs are 
compared at equivalent points when the two programs have the same WTP. Table 5 shows the 
comparison of expected costs at three equivalent points found in previous scenario study. The 
results indicate that ACRE is more efficient, as in all three indifferent points when farmers have 
the same WTPs for the two programs, ACRE always has lower expected government costs.  
Conclusion 
Portfolio rankings in base scenario indicates a strong preference of ACRE for the 
representative central Indiana corn farm in 2009, due to high ACRE guarantee price and 
expected drop in corn price from 2008 level. Substitutive effects between ACRE and hedging in 
futures could be observed through the changes of optimal hedge ratio. ACRE is also more 
valuable when used together in individual insurance than group insurance. 
Scenario studies suggested that farmers consider several price and yield risks together when 
evaluating the value of ACRE, including comparing the expected MYA price, ACRE guaranteed 
price, and CCP target price together. The latter two are known early enough with certainty, 
however, the former, expected market year average price made based on historical experience, 
which makes the value of ACRE different if the past two years observed high price versus low 
price.  
Farmers also consider if corn price have a strong correlation with their state and count yield, 
and whether their own yield have a weak correlation with aggregate yield. What makes the 
decisions difficult is that even both negative and positive factors affecting the value of ACRE are 18 
 
known, it is usually hard to combine positive and negative factors together to weigh the decision 
accurately. In year 2009, even if the farm faces weak dependence between farm and aggregate 
yield, the risk could not offset the addition value ACRE could provide for this year..  
Furthermore, expected government costs of ACRE is lower than those of traditional 
government programs at the equivalent points, which implies that ACRE is a more efficient 
program.   
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Table 1. Policy parameters in government programs and crop insurance for Indiana corn in 2009  
Price Parameters  Yield Parameters 
P C   $505/acre  BS Y   155 bu/acre 
G P   $4.05/bu  BF Y   176.7 bu/acre 
LR  $1.95/bu  YDP  115 bu/acre 
DP R   $0.28/bu  YCCP  131 bu/acre 
PCCP  $2.63/bu  APH Y   178.66 bu/acre 
APH P   $4.00/bu  YGRP  174.64 bu/acre 
0 FU P   $4.08/bu  YGRIP  174.64 bu/acre 
RGRP  $480/acre     
F C   $0.017/bu     
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of simulated stochastic price and yield variables 
   Correlation Matrix          
     F Y   C Y    S Y    FU P     L P     MYA P     Mean  SD  Unit 
F Y   1              178.68  43.46  Bu/acre 
C Y   0.64  1            174.64  26.79  Bu/acre 
S Y   0.42  0.86  1          156.84  20.24  Bu/acre 
FU P   -0.44  -0.39  -0.45  1        4.08  0.69  $/Bu 
L P   -0.44  -0.38  -0.45  0.99  1      3.87  0.68  $/Bu 
  MYA P   -0.42  -0.37  -0.43  0.95  0.93  1     3.71  0.68  $/Bu 
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Table 3. Optimal Hedge Ratios, Insurance Coverage Levels, and WTPs under the Base Scenario 
   No Government Program   
Under Traditional 
Government Program 



























GP Only  NA  NA  0    NA  NA  27.05    NA  NA  50.33 
Futures  0.056  NA  0.022    0.050  NA  27.07    0.00  NA  50.33 
APH  NA  0.85  16.51    NA  0.85  43.52    NA  0.85  67.58 
CRC  NA  0.85  28.38    NA  0.85  55.35    NA  0.85  79.55 
GRP  NA  0.9  9.38    NA  0.9  36.42    NA  0.9  59.66 
GRIP  NA  0.9  13.96    NA  0.9  40.96    NA  0.9  63.45 
APH+Futures  0.29  0.85  17.08    0.28  0.85  44.05    0.11  0.85  67.66 
CRC+Futures  0.29  0.85  28.92    0.28  0.85  55.86    0.11  0.85  79.62 
GRP+Futures  0.15  0.9  9.54    0.14  0.9  36.56    0.00  0.9  59.66 
GRIP+Futures  0.00  0.9  13.96     0.00  0.9  40.96     0.00  0.9  63.45 
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Table 4. WTPs of selected portfolios under different scenarios 
      Indifference between ACRE and Traditional    Prefer ACRE at the Maximum Parameter Change 
 
Base 
















65% increase of 
correlations between 
futures price yields   
89% decrease of 
correlations between 
farm and aggregate 
yield 
  FU P   4.08    FU P   4.74    FU P   4.08    FU P   4.08    ) , ( F FU Y P Corr   -0.75    ) , ( F C Y Y Corr   0.069 
  L P   3.87    L P   4.51    L P   3.87    L P   3.87    ) , ( C FU Y P Corr   -0.65    ) , ( F S Y Y Corr   0.042 
  MYA P   3.71    MYA P   4.32    MYA P   3.71    MYA P   3.71    ) , ( S FU Y P Corr   -0.75    ) , ( S C Y Y Corr   0.86 
  G P   4.05    G P   4.05    G P   3.43    G P   4.05             
  PCCP  2.63    PCCP  2.63    PCCP  2.63    PCCP  3.87             
Traditional  27.1    26.8    27.1    50.3    27.0    27.0 
ACRE  50.3    26.8    27.1    50.3    40.0    45.7 
APH  17.1    17.8    16.5    16.5    14.9    16.5 
APH+Traditional  44.1    44.5    43.5    67.2    42.0    43.5 
APH+ACRE  67.7    44.7    43.9    67.6    56.3    63.7 
CRC  28.9    31.9    28.4    28.4    24.0    28.2 
CRC+Traditional  55.9    58.6    55.4    78.8    51.0    55.2 
CRC+ACRE  79.6    58.9    55.8    79.6    66.2    76.1 
GRP  9.5    9.8    9.4    9.4    8.7    7.0 
GRP+Traditional  36.6    36.6    36.4    59.9    35.7    34.1 
GRP+ACRE  59.7    36.4    36.4    59.7    48.9    53.0 
GRIP  14.0    14.5    14.0    14.0    7.9    10.9 
GRIP+Traditional  41.0    41.3    41.0    63.7    34.9    37.9 
GRIP+ACRE  63.4    40.9    40.7    63.4    47.7    56.3 
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Table 5. Comparisons of Government Costs between ACRE and Traditional Program 
   Base 















  WTP  Cost    WTP  Cost    WTP  Cost    WTP  Cost 
Traditional   27.1  27.0    26.8  26.8    27.1  27.0    50.3  49.9 
ACRE  50.3  49.0     26.8  26.2     27.1  26.6     50.3  49.0 
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Figure 1. Indiana State and Clinton County Corn Yield from 1930 to 2008 
 
































State and county yields are modeled using the following equation:  
j
j j j
j t t Y ε α α α + + + =
2
2 1 0 ln ,  
where Y indicates corn yield, t indicates adjusted time data and j represents county (i=C) or state 
(i=S) level yield. Table A.1. shows parameter estimations of state and county trends. 
Table A.1. Parameter estimation of county and state trend  
Data  Parameter  Estimation  P-value 
County 
c
0 α   3.54  <.0001 
c
1 α   0.029  <.0001 
c
2 α   -0.00011  0.0085 
State 
s
0 α   3.38  <.0001 
s
1 α   0.032  <.0001 
s
2 α   -0.00014  <.0001 
 
Farm yield is assumed to follow county yield trend and detrended residuals are estimated using 
the following equation:  
2
2 1 0 * ˆ * ˆ ˆ ln t t Y e
c c c i
F
i
F α α α − − − = , 
where 
i
F e  is detrended farm residual, and i indicates a particular farm sample.  
Table A.2 below shows the rankings of fitted distributions for state and county residuals, 
with parameter estimations:  30 
 
Table A.2. Ranking of different candidate distributions for aggregate yield residuals and 
parameter estimations 
Distribution    Parameters  KS Test  P-value 
    Alpha  Beta  Max  Min     
Beta 
State  13.64  2.72  0.25  -1.26  0.059  0.93 
County  7.81  1.73  0.25  -1.13  0.051  0.98 
    Shape  Scale  Shift       
Weibull 
State  73.80  7.95  -7.89    0.82  0.069 
County  NA  NA  NA    NA  NA 
    Location  Scale         
Logistic 
State  0.011  0.075      0.092  0.49 
County  0.017  0.089      0.075  0.74 
    Mean  SD         
Normal 
State  0  0.14      0.12  0.20 
County  0  0.16      0.10  0.35 
 
Below are equations of price difference models and their parameter estimations:  
ε β β + + = FU L P P 1 0 , and  ν δ δ + + = FU MYA P P 1 0  
Normality tests suggest residuals from both models are normally distributed. In Table A.3, 
parameters of two price difference models are summarized.  
Table A.3. Summary of mean and variance of simulated stochastic futures price, local price and 
MYA price, and parameters of two price difference models 
  Parameters  P-value 
L P  
0 β = -0.090  0.40 
1 β = -0.97  <0.0001 
MYA P  
0 δ =0.081  0.66 
1 δ =0.93  <0.0001 
 